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Dealing with a diverse set of problems in practical and theoretical ethics, these fourteen essays, three of them previously unpublished, reconfirm Joel Feinberg’s leading position in the field of legal philosophy. With a clarity and humor that will be familiar to readers of his other works, Feinberg writes on topics including “wrongful life” suits in the law of torts, or whether there is any sense in the remark that a person is so badly off that he would be better off not existing at all; the morality of abortion; educational options; free expression; civil disobedience; and the duty of easy rescue in criminal law. He continues with a three-part defense of moral rights in the abstract, a discussion of voluntary euthanasia, and an inquiry into arguments of various kinds for not granting legal rights in enforcement of a person’s acknowledged moral rights. This collection concludes with two essays dealing with concepts used in appraising the whole of a person’s life: absurdity and self-fulfillment, and their interplay.Dealing with a diverse set of problems in practical and theoretical ethics, these fourteen essays, three of them previously unpublished, reconfirm Joel Feinberg’s leading position in the field of legal philosophy. With a clarity and humor that will be familiar to readers of his other works, Feinberg writes on topics including “wrongful life” suits in the law of torts, or whether there is any sense in the remark that a person is so badly off that he would be better off not existing at all; the morality of abortion; educational options; free expression; civil disobedience; and the duty of easy rescue in criminal law. He continues with a three-part defense of moral rights in theabstract, a discussion of voluntary euthanasia, and an inquiry into arguments of various kinds for not granting legal rights in enforcement of a person’s acknowledged moral rights. This collection concludes with two essays dealing with concepts used in appraising the whole of a person’s life: absurdity and self-fulfillment, and their interplay.
Jeremy Carrette argues that the psychology of religion is no longer sustainable without a social critique, and that as William James predicted, the project of the modernist psychology of religion has failed. Controversially he champions greater social and philosophical analysis within the field to challenge the political naivety and disciplinary illusions of the traditional approaches to psychology of religion. Carrette discusses the relevance of the social and economic factors surrounding the debates of psychology and religion, through three critical examples: psychoanalysis humanistic psychology cognitive neuroscience. A Critical Psychology of Religion provides a new dimension to the debates surrounding religious experience. It will be of interest to students and researchers in the fields of critical psychology, religious experience and the psychology of religion and extends aninterdisciplinary challenge to the separation of psychology, sociology, politics, economics and religion.
Social Motivation, Justice, and the Moral Emotions proposes an attribution theory of interpersonal or social motivation that distinguishes between the role of thinking and feeling in determining action. The place of this theory within the larger fields of motivation and attributional analyses is explored. It features new thoughts concerning social motivation on such topics as help giving, aggression, achievement evaluation, compliance to commit a transgression, as well as new contributions to the understanding of social justice. Included also is material on moral emotions, with discussions of admiration, contempt, envy, gratitude, and other affects not considered in Professor Weiner’s prior work. The text also contains previously unexamined topics regarding social inferences of arrogance and modesty and the role of mediators versus moderators in theory building. Divided into five chapters, this book: *Considers the logical development and structure of a proposed theory of social motivation and justice; *Reviews meta-analytic tests of the theory within the contexts of help giving and aggression and examines issues related to cultural and individual differences; *Focuses on moral emotions including an analysis of admiration, envy, gratitude, jealousy, scorn, and others; *Discusses conditions where reward decreases motivation while punishment augments strivings; and *Provides applications that are beneficial in the classroom, in therapy, and in training programs. Social Motivation, Justice, and the Moral Emotions appeals to practicing and research psychologists and advanced students in a variety of fields including social, educational, personality, political/legal, health, and clinical psychology. It will also serve as a supplement in courses on motivational psychology, emotion and motivation, altruism and/or pro-social behavior, aggression, social judgment, and morality. Also included is the raw material (e.g., questionnaires, surveys, etc.) for 13 experiments relating to core predictions of the proposed attribution theory.
Nomy Arpaly rejects the model of rationality used by most ethicists and action theorists. Both observation and psychology indicate that people act rationally without deliberation, and act irrationally with deliberation. By questioning the notion that our own minds are comprehensible to us–and therefore questioning much of the current work of action theorists and ethicists–Arpaly attempts to develop a more realistic conception of moral agency.
ما از اخلاق چه انتظاری داریم؟ این سوال شاید تاحدودی برای عموم مردم و یا متخصصان این رشته قابل پاسخ باشد؛ اینکه خوب بودن را به ما بیاموزد و در تنظیم روابط فردی م...
جشن کتاب تهران به ایستگاه سی و یکم رسیده است. حال و احوال نشر کتاب خوب نیست و باید فرهنگدوستان را به خرید و هدیه دادن کتاب ترغیب نمود. خانه اخلاقپژوهان جوان ب...
بنیاد کتابهای اخلاق اسلامی عمدتا پالایش جان از آلودگیها و آراستن آن به زیباییها است. اندیشه محوری این قبیل کتابها آن است که انسان فعلی آنی نیست که باید باشد...
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