Notice: تابع WP_Block_Type_Registry::register به طورنادرست فراخوانی شد. نامهای نوع بلوک نباید حروف بزرگ داشته باشند. لطفاً برای اطلاعات بیشتر، اشکال زدایی در وردپرس را مشاهده کنید. (این پیام در نگارش 5.0.0 افزوده شده است.) in /home/ethicsho/public_html/wp-includes/functions.php on line 5313
Warning: Use of undefined constant TDC_PATH_LEGACY - assumed 'TDC_PATH_LEGACY' (this will throw an Error in a future version of PHP) in /home/ethicsho/public_html/wp-content/plugins/td-composer/td-composer.php on line 109
Warning: Use of undefined constant TDSP_THEME_PATH - assumed 'TDSP_THEME_PATH' (this will throw an Error in a future version of PHP) in /home/ethicsho/public_html/wp-content/plugins/td-composer/td-composer.php on line 113 بایگانیهای 9780199291458 - خانه اخلاق پژوهان جوان Notice: Trying to access array offset on value of type bool in /home/ethicsho/public_html/wp-content/plugins/wp-ulike/inc/general-functions.php on line 807
This book deals with foundational issues in the history of the nature of action, the intentionality of action, the compatibility of freedom of action with determinism, and the explanation of action. Ginet’s is a volitional view: that every action has as its core a “simple” mental action. He develops a sophisticated account of the individuation of actions and also propounds a challenging version of the view that freedom of action is incompatible with determinism.
Christine M. Korsgaard is one of today’s leading moral philosophers: this volume collects ten influential papers by her on practical reason and moral psychology. Korsgaard draws on the work of important figures in the history of philosophy such as Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hume, showing how their ideas can inform the solution of contemporary and traditional philosophical problems, such as the foundations of morality and practical reason, the nature of agency, and the role of the emotions in action. In Part 1, The Principles of Practical Reason, Korsgaard defends the view that the principles of practical reason are constitutive principles of action. By governing our actions in accordance with Kant’s categorical imperative and the principle of instrumental reason, she argues, we take control of our own movements and so render ourselves active, self-determining beings. She criticizes rival attempts to give a normative foundation to the principles of practical reason, challenges the claims of the principle of maximizing one’s own interests to be a rational principle, and argues for some deep continuities between Plato’s account of the connection between justice and agency and Kant’s account of the connection between autonomy and agency. In Part II, Moral Virtue and Moral Psychology , Korsgaard takes up the question of the role of our more passive or receptive faculties–our emotions and responses –in constituting our agency. She sketches a reading of the Nicomachean Ethics , based on the idea that our emotions can serve as perceptions of good and evil, and argues that this view of the emotions is at the root of the apparent differences between Aristotle and Kant’s accounts of morality. She argues that in fact, Aristotle and Kant share a distinctive view about the locus of moral value and the nature of human choice that, among other things, gives them account of what it means to act rationally that is superior to other accounts. In Part III, Other Reflections, Korsgaard takes up question how we come to view one another as moral agents in Hume’s philosophy. She examines the possible clash between the agency of the state and that of the individual that led to Kant’s paradoxical views about revolution. And finally, she discusses her methodology in an account of what it means to be a constructivist moral philosopher. The essays are united by an introduction in which Korsgaard explains their connections to each other and to her current work.
“Theories of distributive justice are most severely tested in the area of disability. In this book, Mark Stein argues that utilitarianism performs better than egalitarian theories in this area whereas egalitarian theories help the disabled either too little or too much, utilitarianism achieves the proper balance by placing resources where they will do the most good.” “Stein offers what may be the broadest critique of egalitarian theory from a utilitarian perspective. He addresses the work of egalitarian theorists John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Amartya Sen, Bruce Ackerman, Martha Nusshaum, Norman Daniels, Philippe Van Parijs, and others. Stein claims that egalitarians are often driven to borrow elements of utilitarianism in order to make their theories at all plausible.”–BOOK JACKET.
For much of the twentieth century, philosophy and science went their separate ways. In moral philosophy, fear of the so-called naturalistic fallacy kept moral philosophers from incorporating developments in biology and psychology. Since the 1990s, however, many philosophers have drawn on recent advances in cognitive psychology, brain science, and evolutionary psychology to inform their work. This collaborative trend is especially strong in moral philosophy, and these three volumes bring together some of the most innovative work by both philosophers and psychologists in this emerging interdisciplinary field.Contributors to Volume 3:Abigail Baird (Vassar College), William Casebeer (Air Force Academy), Cordelia Fine (Monash University), Nathan Fox (University of Maryland), Uta Frith (University College London, Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience), Jordan Grafman (National Institute of Health), Joshua Greene (Harvard University), Catherine Hynes (School of Psychology, University of Queensland), Fatima Azavedo Ignacio (Cognitive Psychology, Instituto Philippe Pinel), Richard Joyce (Australian National University Research School of Social Science), Jerome Kagan (Harvard University) Leonard Katz (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Kent Kiehl (Yale University), Jeanette Kennett (Center for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Australian National University), Melanie Killen (University of Maryland), Daniel Lapsley (Ball State University), Heidi Maibom (Carleton University), Victoria McGeer (Princeton University), John Mikhail (Georgetown Law School), Jorge Moll (National Institute of Health), Shaun Nichols (University of Arizona), Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza (Universidade do Rio de Janeiro), Adina Roskies (Dartmouth College), Mirella L. M. F. Paiva (National Institutes of Health), Jana Schaich Borg (Olin Neuropsychiatry Research Center, Institute of Living), Katrina Sifferd (Dartmouth College), Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Dartmouth College), Michael Smith (Princeton University), Mark Timmons (University of Arizona), Frederick de Vignemont (Institut des sciences cognitives, CNRS), Paul Whalen (Dartmouth College), Roland Zahn (National Institute of Health).
ما از اخلاق چه انتظاری داریم؟ این سوال شاید تاحدودی برای عموم مردم و یا متخصصان این رشته قابل پاسخ باشد؛ اینکه خوب بودن را به ما بیاموزد و در تنظیم روابط فردی م...
جشن کتاب تهران به ایستگاه سی و یکم رسیده است. حال و احوال نشر کتاب خوب نیست و باید فرهنگدوستان را به خرید و هدیه دادن کتاب ترغیب نمود. خانه اخلاقپژوهان جوان ب...
بنیاد کتابهای اخلاق اسلامی عمدتا پالایش جان از آلودگیها و آراستن آن به زیباییها است. اندیشه محوری این قبیل کتابها آن است که انسان فعلی آنی نیست که باید باشد...
-
0 Comments