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Democracy is not naturally plausible. Why turn such important matters over to masses of people who have no expertise? Many theories of democracy answer by appealing to the intrinsic value of democratic procedure, leaving aside whether it makes good decisions. In Democratic Authority, David Estlund offers a groundbreaking alternative based on the idea that democratic authority and legitimacy must depend partly on democracy’s tendency to make good decisions. Just as with verdicts in jury trials, Estlund argues, the authority and legitimacy of a political decision does not depend on the particular decision being good or correct. But the “epistemic value” of the procedure–the degree to which it can generally be accepted as tending toward a good decision–is nevertheless crucial. Yet if good decisions were all that mattered, one might wonder why those who know best shouldn’t simply rule. Estlund’s theory–which he calls “epistemic proceduralism”–avoids epistocracy, or the rule of those who know. He argues that while some few people probably do know best, this can be used in political justification only if their expertise is acceptable from all reasonable points of view. If we seek the best epistemic arrangement in this respect, it will be recognizably democratic–with laws and policies actually authorized by the people subject to them.
Mark Graber looks at the history of abortion law in action to argue that the only defensible, constitutional approach to the issue is to afford all women equal choice – abortion should remain legal or bans should be strictly enforced. Steering away from metaphysical critiques of privacy, Graber compares the philosophical, constitutional, and democratic merits of the two systems of abortion regulation witnessed in the twentieth-century: pre-Roe v. Wade statutory prohibitions on abortion and Roe’s ban on significant state interference with the market for safe abortion services. He demonstrates that before Roe, pro-life measures were selectively and erratically administered, thereby subverting our constitutional commitment to equal justice. Claiming that these measures would be similarly administered if reinstated, the author seeks to increase support for keeping abortion legal, even among those who have reservations about its morality. Abortion should remain legal, Graber argues, because statutory bans on abortion have a history of being enforced in ways that intentionally discriminate against poor persons and persons of color. In the years before Roe, the same law enforcement officials who routinely ignored and sometimes assisted those physicians seeking to terminate pregnancies for their private patients too often prevented competent abortionists from offering the same services to the general public. This double standard violated the fundamental human and constitutional right of equal justice under law, a right that has powerful roots in the American political tradition and that remains a major concern of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The pursuit of happiness is a defining theme of the modern era. But what if people aren’t very good at it? This and related questions are explored in this book, the first comprehensive philosophical treatment of happiness in the contemporary psychological sense. In these pages, Dan Haybron argues that people are probably less effective at judging, and promoting, their own welfare than common belief has it. For the psychological dimensions of well-being, particularly our emotional lives, are far richer and more complex than we tend to realize. Knowing one’s own interests is no trivial matter. As well, we tend to make a variety of systematic errors in the pursuit of happiness. We may need, then, to rethink traditional assumptions about human nature, the good life, and the good society. Thoroughly engaged with both philosophical and scientific work on happiness and well-being, this book will be a definitive resource for philosophers, social scientists, policymakers, and other students of human well-being.
ما از اخلاق چه انتظاری داریم؟ این سوال شاید تاحدودی برای عموم مردم و یا متخصصان این رشته قابل پاسخ باشد؛ اینکه خوب بودن را به ما بیاموزد و در تنظیم روابط فردی م...
جشن کتاب تهران به ایستگاه سی و یکم رسیده است. حال و احوال نشر کتاب خوب نیست و باید فرهنگدوستان را به خرید و هدیه دادن کتاب ترغیب نمود. خانه اخلاقپژوهان جوان ب...
بنیاد کتابهای اخلاق اسلامی عمدتا پالایش جان از آلودگیها و آراستن آن به زیباییها است. اندیشه محوری این قبیل کتابها آن است که انسان فعلی آنی نیست که باید باشد...
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