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At a time when age-old political structures are crumbling, civil strife abounds, and economic uncertainty permeates the air, loyalty offers us security in our relationships with associates, friends, and family. Yet loyalty is a suspect virtue. It is not impartial. It is not blind. Itviolates the principles of morality that have dominated Western thought for the last two hundred years.Loyalties are also thought to be irrational and contrary to the spirit of Capitalism. In a free market society, we are encouraged to move to the competition when we are not happy. This way of thinking has invaded our personal relationships and undermined our capacities for friendship and loyaltyto those who do not serve our immediate interests. As George P. Fletcher writes, it is time for loyal bonds, born of history and experience, to prevail both over impartial morality and the self-interested thinking of the market trader.In this extended essay, George P. Fletcher offers an account of loyalty that illuminates its role in our relationships with family and friends, our ties to country, and the commitment of the religious to God and their community. Fletcher opposes the traditional view of the moral self as detachedfrom context and history. He argues instead that loyalty, not impartial detachment, should be the central feature of our moral and political lives. Writing as a political “liberal,” he claims that a commitment to country is necessary to improve the lot of the poor and disadvantaged. This commitmentto country may well require greater reliance on patriotic rituals in education and a reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s extending the First Amendment to protect flag burning. Given the worldwide currents of parochialism and political decentralization, the task for us, Fletcher argues, is torenew our commitment to a single nation united in its diversity.Bringing to bear his expertise as a law professor, Fletcher reasons that the legal systems should defer to existing relationships of loyalty. Familial, professional, and religious loyalties should be respected as relationships beyond the limits of the law. Thus surrogate mothers should not beforced to surrender and betray their children, spouses should not be required to testify against each other in court, parents should not be prevented from willing their property to their children, and the religiously committed should not be forced to act contrary to conscience.Yet the question remains: Aren’t loyalty, and particularly patriotism, dangerously one-sided? Indeed, they are, but no more than are love and friendship. The challenge, Fletcher maintains, is to overcome the distorting effects of impartial morality and to develop a morality of loyalty properlysuited to our emotional and spiritual lives. Justice has its sphere, as do loyalties. In this book, Fletcher provides the first step toward a new way of thinking that recognizes the complexity of our moral and political lives.
This fresh analysis of the “state of the question” in religious ethics charts the course for future study and exploration in the field. Written in honor of James Gustafson, who provides a conclusion, these 22 original and tightly argued essays examine hotly debated controversies on a wide range of topics, from sources of theological ethics to the moral life. At the core of these complementary perspectives is the ever-increasing tension between the particularity of religious and philosophical traditions and the universality of moral discourse. Designed for classroom use.
Christine M. Korsgaard is one of today’s leading moral philosophers: this volume collects ten influential papers by her on practical reason and moral psychology. Korsgaard draws on the work of important figures in the history of philosophy such as Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hume, showing how their ideas can inform the solution of contemporary and traditional philosophical problems, such as the foundations of morality and practical reason, the nature of agency, and the role of the emotions in action. In Part 1, The Principles of Practical Reason, Korsgaard defends the view that the principles of practical reason are constitutive principles of action. By governing our actions in accordance with Kant’s categorical imperative and the principle of instrumental reason, she argues, we take control of our own movements and so render ourselves active, self-determining beings. She criticizes rival attempts to give a normative foundation to the principles of practical reason, challenges the claims of the principle of maximizing one’s own interests to be a rational principle, and argues for some deep continuities between Plato’s account of the connection between justice and agency and Kant’s account of the connection between autonomy and agency. In Part II, Moral Virtue and Moral Psychology , Korsgaard takes up the question of the role of our more passive or receptive faculties–our emotions and responses –in constituting our agency. She sketches a reading of the Nicomachean Ethics , based on the idea that our emotions can serve as perceptions of good and evil, and argues that this view of the emotions is at the root of the apparent differences between Aristotle and Kant’s accounts of morality. She argues that in fact, Aristotle and Kant share a distinctive view about the locus of moral value and the nature of human choice that, among other things, gives them account of what it means to act rationally that is superior to other accounts. In Part III, Other Reflections, Korsgaard takes up question how we come to view one another as moral agents in Hume’s philosophy. She examines the possible clash between the agency of the state and that of the individual that led to Kant’s paradoxical views about revolution. And finally, she discusses her methodology in an account of what it means to be a constructivist moral philosopher. The essays are united by an introduction in which Korsgaard explains their connections to each other and to her current work.
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